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Banco Central de Chile
Resumen
Este artículo revisa la experiencia chilena de crecimiento, con especial énfasis en el rápido
crecimiento que comenzó a mediados de los años ochenta, cuando la economía se recuperaba de la
crisis de 1982, para moderarse a fines de los noventa. También se analiza y se descompone la
evidencia sobre el crecimiento y la actividad, revisando las fortalezas y debilidades tras el despegue
económico de Chile y los elementos que sustentan el crecimiento futuro. Por último, se presentan
estimaciones de la tasa de crecimiento potencial de largo plazo para la economía chilena.
Abstract
This paper reviews the Chilean experience of growth, with particular focus on the rapid growth that
began in the mid-1980s, as the economy recovered from the crisis of 1982. This process slowed down
in the late nineties. This paper also reviews the evidence on growth and decomposes the rate of growth
and the level of output into its components. It discusses the strengths and weaknesses that explain
Chile’s growth take-off and that support future growth. Finally, the paper reviews estimates of the
potential rate of long-run growth for the Chilean economy.
________________
I have benefited from comments and suggestions by César Calderón, Sebastian Edwards, Rodrigo
Fuentes, Joe Ramos, Rodrigo Valdés and Rodrigo Vergara. I am also grateful to Gonzalo Becerra, and
especially to Marco Nuñez for superb research assistance and help with the data. All views expressed
in the paper are my own.
E-mail: jdegrego@bcentral.cl.1 Introduction
The rates of growth recorded by the Chilean economy since the second half of the 1980s
have been high not only by Chile’s own historical standards, but also from an international
comparativeperspective. What havebeenthe causesofthis growthtake-off? What doesthis
record of growth portend for the future? What were the key underlying factors in Chile’s
success, and what weaknesses remain? These questions are relevant not only for Chile’s
policymakers and others interested in Chile, but also for drawing more general lessons for
other countries. The purpose of this paper is to address these issues.
I begin by reviewing the history of Chile’s growth, beginning in the 19th century, and
I conduct a growth accounting analysis for the more recent periods. To summarize, the
Chilean economy suffered from slow growth until the mid-1980s. It then enjoyed a sharp
recovery after the debt crisis, and growth continued through most of the 1990s. Growth then
slowed after 1998 but remained at about its average rate for the 20th century as a whole,
and indeed above the rate of the ﬁrst eighty-ﬁve years of the century.
The paper then proceeds to discuss, in the next two sections, the strengths and weak-
nesses of the Chilean economy. One possible approach would have been to estimate cross-
country growth regressions and examine how Chile has performed on the different factors
that such an analysis shows to be the determinants of long-run growth.1 However, a disad-
vantage of this approach is that one is constrained to a certain set of explanatory variables.
Adding variables reduces degrees of freedom, introduces collinearity among the regressors,
and theoretical models do not explain properly the simultaneous inclusion of all variables.
For this reason I follow a more eclectic approach, considering those determinants of growth
that have been shown to be relevant in many other cross-country analyses. This approach,
of course, is limited to my own reading of the enormous empirical literature on growth
determinants and their relevance for Chile.
Among Chile’s strengths, I identify and discuss the roles of low inﬂation, ﬁscal disci-
pline, openness to the world economy, a strong ﬁnancial system, institutional strength, and
good infrastructure. Chile ranks very high with respect to the efﬁciency of its regulation of
business and other institutions, but some weaknesses also appear, mainly in the difﬁculties
that owners face in closing a business. Among Chile’s weaknesses I emphasize the role of
income inequality, although Chile’s policies have been able to minimize the distortionary
effects that such inequality tends to introduce in policymaking. I also discuss weaknesses in
Chilean research and development (both its level and its composition), quality of education,
and the regional economic climate and its failure to promote trade.
Next I present evidence from a number of studies on the long-run prospects of the
Chilean economy. A rate of GDP growth of 5 percent a year seems a reasonable estimate
for the future. A higher rate of growth could be achieved, but it would require overcoming
some of the weaknesses in the present growth environment just mentioned. I offer some
1This was done in a very interesting study by Gallego and Loayza (2002).
1concluding remarks in the paper’s ﬁnal section.
2 Evidence from History, Growth Accounting and In-
ternational Comparisons
Rapid economic growth is a relatively new phenomenon for Chile. Before growth took off
in the mid-1980s, Chile had experienced occasional periods of rapid growth, but the rate
of growth in those episodes was much less than in the country’s more recent experience,
and not very different from the contemporaneous rate of growth in the world economy as a
whole.
This section presents evidence from a variety of data sources. The intent is not to give
precise and deﬁnitive ﬁgures, but rather to reveal broad trends, which should be the same
whichever data one uses. For national comparisons I will use the ofﬁcial national accounts
from the Central Bank of Chile and historical data from D´ ıaz et al. (2003). For long-run
international comparisons I will use Maddison (1995), and for more recent cross-country
data I will rely on the Penn World Tables version 6.1.
2.1 A long term view
Figure 1 traces the history of national output in Chile since independence, using data gath-
ered by D´ ıaz et al. (2003). Table 1 summarizes average rates of growth of GDP and of GDP
per capita for selected periods, whose endpoints mark clear changes in trend growth.
From independence until the Paciﬁc War per capita growth was slow, only 0.8 percent
a year. Since then and until the Great Depression the economy grew somewhat faster at
1.5 percent a year in per capita terms, but with large ﬂuctuations due mostly to the crisis
in the nitrate industry in the 1910s. Chile suffered a precipitous decline in GDP per capita
of 45 percent during the Depression years 1930-32, but a strong recovery followed, which
continued with moderate growth (2.6 percent a year on average) until 1971. From 1972
until 1983, GDP per capita actually fell. This period started with a fall in output from 1972
to 1975 and ended with the debt crisis and another decline in output in 1982-83. Then began
the period of rapid growth, which lasted until the slowdown in the late 1990s. One way to
summarize Chile’s record of growth during the 20th century is to note that, starting in 1900,
it took 62 years for Chile’s GDP to double, but from that point it took only another 30 years
to double again.
The choice of the year when growth in Chile really took off is necessarily somewhat
arbitrary, in particular since the years immediately following the recession of 1982, when
output declined by 13.5 percent, were basically a recovery from that downturn. With this
caveat in mind, as a simple illustration one can divide the entire century into two periods,








































































































































































Figure 1: GDP per capita 1810-2003 (1900=100)












Source: D´ ıaz et al. (2004) and Central
Bank of Chile.
* The rate of growth of per capita GDP
from 1932 to 1950 was 3.9%
annual rate of 0.9 percent, the average annual rate of growth for the century as a whole was
1.5 percent, thanks to the sharp increase in the growth rate after 1985.2
Growth slowed once again during 1998, and the repercussions of the Asian crisis and
a sharp domestic liquidity crisis led to a decline in output of 0.8 percent in 1999. Growth
since then has been slow. For this reason the period 1985-97 is sometimes called Chile’s
“golden period,” during which GDP growth averaged 7.1 percent a year and income per
capita doubled. Since then growth in GDP per capita has averaged 1.3 percent a year, a
fraction of its rate in the previous 13 years, but still higher than the average for the ﬁrst 85
years of the 20th century.
One could go further, then, and split the period since 1985 into two periods: the golden
period, which lasted until 1997, and the period of slower growth since then. This is what
has caused concern about Chile’s true capacity to grow: was the golden period only a
temporary phenomenon, or can Chile return to that level of growth? A hopeful sign is that,
as the economy has recovered from the recession of 1999, it has started to grow at rates
between 2 and 5 percent.
Table 2 provides a historical view of Chile’s growth performance from an international
perspective. The data are taken from Maddison (1995), that is the most comprehensive
and complete source of long-term data for historical as well as cross-country comparisons,
2According to Maddison (1995), the source used here for international comparisons, Chile’s
average annual rate of growth of GDP per capita for the ﬁrst 85 years of the century was 1.2
percent, and completing the series with oﬃcial data yields a rate of growth of 1.7 percent for the
whole of the 20th century. This is somewhat higher than in the data of D´ ıaz et al. (2004) discussed
in the text, but it does not make a signiﬁcant diﬀerence to the interpretation.
4Table 2: Per Capita GDP 1900-1992 (PPP, US dollars 1990)
1900 1913 1950 1960 1970 1992 1992
1900
Chile 1949 2653 3827 4304 5217 7238 3.71
Argentina 2756 3797 4987 5559 7970 7616 2.76
Australia 4299 5505 7218 8539 11637 16237 3.78
Brazil 704 839 1673 2335 3913 4637 6.59
China 652 688 614 878 1186 3098 4.75
Finland 1620 2050 4131 6051 9302 14646 9.04
Germany 3134 3833 4281 8463 13152 19351 6.17
Ireland 2495 2733 3518 4368 6250 11711 4.69
Japan 1135 1334 1873 3879 9448 19425 17.11
Korea 850 948 876 1302 2208 10010 11.78
Mexico 1157 1467 2085 2781 4189 5112 4.42
New Zealand 4320 5178 8495 9491 11278 13947 3.23
Norway 1762 2275 4969 6549 9122 17543 9.96
Phillipines 1033 1418 1293 1488 1766 2213 2.14
Spain 2040 2255 2397 3437 7291 12498 6.13
USA 4096 5307 9573 11193 14854 21558 5.26
Chile/USA (%) 47.6 50.0 40.0 38.5 35.1 33.6
Chile/Western Europe (%) 65.1 77.4 68.3 53.3 41.0 41.3
Source: Maddison (1995)
although data for most countries are available only until 1992. Among the countries in the
table, Chile had one of the lowest rates of growth over the century as a whole: GDP per
capita increased by less than fourfold. Within Latin America, only Argentina, one of the
world economy’s great disappointments, had slower growth. In 1900 both Argentina and
Chile were richer than Finland and Norway, but by 1950 Norway had already taken the lead
over Chile, followed by Finland by 1960. Within Latin America, Brazil’s growth started
out very strong in the second half of the century but came to a sharp halt after 1980.
Chile’s poor growth performance after 1913, which coincided with the collapse of the
nitrate industry, led to a persistently widening gap in terms of income per capita between
Chile and the United States and Western Europe. Chile’s income per capita fell from half
that of the United States in 1913 to only 35 percent in 1970, reaching a minimum of 27
percent in 1975. Since then the gap has narrowed, and it has done so more systematically
since the mid-1980s, to reach 39 percent of the U.S. level in 2000.
5Table 3: GDP per-capita Growth since 1960
60s 70s 80s 90s 1960
2000
Chile 2.2 1.2 1.3 4.8 2.4
Latin America* 2.2 2.5 -0.9 1.8 1.4
East Asia ** 4.7 5.4 4.5 4.0 4.6
Japan 9.3 3.1 3.5 1.1 4.2
USA 2.9 2.7 2.2 2.3 2.5
World *** 2.5 2.0 1.0 1.3 1.7
Source: De Gregorio and Lee (2004), based on Atten,
Summers and Heston (2002).
* The 15 countries with largest GDP: Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.
** China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.
*** 85 countries for which data are available, the
averages are unweighed.
2.2 Growth and investment since the 60s
A more recent international comparison is provided in table 3, which uses the growth data
from the Penn World Tables version 6.1 since 1960. During the 1960s Chile and Latin
America as a whole achieved a reasonable rate of growth of 2.2 percent a year, but this was
below the world average and that of the United States, and below what can be considered
good performance. During this period the variability of growth in the region was low, and
most Latin American countries experienced positive rates of growth. For this reason the
1960s are remembered as a good period for the region. But, as the table shows, it was an
even better period for the world as a whole, and therefore the income gap between Latin
America and the developed world increased. Of particular importance for Chile, the 1960s
saw the highest copper prices of the postwar period until today.
A similar pattern is observed for Latin America in the 1970s, but Chile’s performance
was well below that of the rest of the region and the world as a whole. This fact is explained
not only by the oil shock but also by the domestic policies in place during that decade,
starting with the populist experience of the early 1970s, followed by the sharp decline in
output during the money-based stabilization of the mid-1970s and the ﬁrst oil shock. It
is interesting to note that, although the oil shock did indeed reduce world growth, Latin
6America grew faster than in the previous decade, largely because of Brazil,3 whose income
per capita, adjusted for purchasing powerparity (PPP), grewat an annual rate of 5.7 percent.
This suggests that the decline of growth in Chile was due much more to domestic factors.
The 1980s, in contrast, were the “lost decade” in Latin America, but less so in Chile,
which had already begun to beneﬁt from reforms that encouraged growth. Indeed, despite
the steep decline in output in the 1982 collapse, the economy recovered quickly, and its
average growth during the decade was 2.2 percentage points a year faster than the average
for the 15 largest countries in the region. Comparing the patterns of collapse and recovery
in the Latin American crisis and the later East Asian crisis, De Gregorio and Lee (2004)
observe that Chile, and Mexico after the Tequila crisis, are the only Latin American coun-
tries whose growth trajectory took the V-shape pattern typical of the Asian countries, with
a sharp downturn followed by a strong recovery. The table also shows clearly that Chile’s
rapid growth was a phenomenon of the 1990s, although it started in the mid-1980s. The
Chilean economy was able to achieve a record rate of growth not only by its own historical
standards, but also in international comparisons, growing more than three times the average








































































































Source: IMF World Economic Outlook and Banco Central de Chile
Chile United States World (ppp) Latin America Emerging Markets and DCs
Figure 2: GDP per capita 1980-2003
Figure 2 further highlights the good performance of the Chilean economy in the late
3 In any case the averages in table 3 are unweighted
71980s and the 1990s and the slowdown of the late 1990s. The ﬁgure is based on data from
the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook, and the country group aver-
ages are computed using PPP weights. Latin America shows no increase in income since
the Asian crisis of the late 1990s. Growth in emerging markets as a whole also declined dur-
ing the Asian crisis but later resumed. The slowdown in Chile started in 1998 and continued
with the recession of 1999. Since then, concern over how to restore growth to a rate closer
to that of the golden period has been one of the most important topics in policy discussions
in Chile. However, taking a longer-term view of the Chilean economy allows us to conclude
that even this period of slow growth has been good by historical standards. Between 1998
and 2003 the rate of growth of GDP per capita has averaged 1.3 percent a year, compared
with 1.2 percent a year from 1900 to 1985. During this slower-growth period, Chile has
grown more slowly than the world average of 2.4 percent a year, and more slowly than the
United States at 1.9 percent a year. But with the recovery expected for 2004-05, the rate of
growth in GDP per capita should increase to about 1.9 percent a year.
As ﬁgure 3 shows, investment in Chile reached a record high during the growth take-off
of the 1990s. As I will discuss later, the contribution of capital to growth was key during the
1990s. However, I will not mention investment as a strength or weakness in Chile’s growth,
for two reasons. First, we know that growth is the result of the accumulation of factors (one
of which is physical capital) and of higher productivity, but the factors that foster growth are
also those that increase investment and productivity. Moreover, in the standard neoclassical
(Solow) growth model, productivity is what drives growth and investment. In other words,
investment is endogenous. For example, being an open economy helps both productivity
and investment.
Second, higher investment could be caused by factors that do not affect productivity.
That is, there could be economic policies that affect only investment, and thus increase
growth through capital accumulation only. However, this question has been resolved by the
empirical literature. According to most estimates, including the investment rate separately
from other factors that determine growth in cross-country regressions results in a coefﬁcient
for the investment rate of about 0.07, which implies that even a relatively large increase in
the investment-GDP ratio of 5 percentage points would raise the growth rate by only 0.35
percentage point. For this reason I do not include investment, domestic or foreign, as a
fundamental factor inducing growth, but rather consider it a result of a good scenario for
growth. This has been also the route taken by other studies of the growth take-off in Chile
using different approaches (Bergoeing et al., 2002; Gallego and Loayza, 2002).
Nevertheless, one can imagine policies that would affect growth mainly, or even exclu-
sively, through investment. Tax policies are an important example, and recent discussions
in Chile have focused on the role of corporate taxation. According to existing empirical
evidence, changes in the corporate tax would have no effect on the desired stock of capital
(Bustos et al., 2003), but recent preliminary evidence has found that changes in the tax rate
on investment could have some effect. According to Vergara (2004), whose evidence has
been used to argue that large beneﬁts would result from reducing corporate taxation, a large
































































































Source: Central Bank of Chile. 1960-95: Chile Social and Economic Indicators 
Figure 3: Investment Rate 1960-2003
9the rate of investment by 2 to 3 percentage points. Yet such an increase in investment, ac-
cording to parameters mentioned above, would increase growth by only 0.15 to 0.21 percent
a year.4
2.3 Sources of economic growth
Economic growth results from an increase in quantity of either or both of the factors of
production, labor and capital, or from an increase in total factor productivity (TFP). Along
these lines, a ﬁrst approach to examining the growth experience is to decompose it into
the contribution of the increases in labor and capital and the contribution of TFP, using the
method pioneered by Solow (1957). Consider the following production function, which
transforms labor (L) and capital (K) into output (Y ):
Y = AF(K;L); (1)
where A is TFP. An increase in TFP implies that the economy can produce more with the
same amount of factors. Assuming that the production function exhibits constant returns
to scale, and that factor and goods markets are competitive, we can write the percentage













The parameter ® represents the share of capital in total income and 1¡® the share of labor.
Therefore equation (2) allows us to compute the contributions of capital, labor and TFP to
output growth.
The table 4 presents a decomposition for Chile for the period 1970-2004. For the in-
come share of labor I use 0.6, a ﬁgure somewhat larger than that implied by the national
accounts, but smaller than that suggested be evidence at the international level.5 The re-
sults do not change signiﬁcantly when the labor share is increased to 0.65. To construct the
stock of capital, I use the perpetual inventory method with a depreciation rate of 6 percent.
Finally, L is measured as total employment, with no adjustment for the quality of the labor
force or for the number of hours worked per person.
4The fact the the eﬀects could be small should not be used as an argument for increasing
corporate taxation, however. The evidence discussed in the text is very partial. It does not
consider all of the eﬀects that corporate taxes have on the economy, especially on the dynamics of
saving. My reading of the current literature on public ﬁnance is that capital taxation is generally
bad; however, no comprehensive research for the Chilean economy has been done in this area. In
any case, the point here is that the issue of how to stimulate investment is much more subtle and
complicated than popular discussions suggest. More research is needed to have a full assessment of
the eﬀects of the tax-system on growth and how it can be improved to promote it.
5Gollin (2002) argues that the lower value obtained from the national accounts stems from the
fact that labor income is underestimated in small ﬁrms, and that after making the appropriate
adjustments the labor share is between 0.65 and 0.8.
10Table 4: Sources of Economic Growth, 1970-2004
Output Contribution of
Growth Capital Labor TFP
1970-74 0.93 1.16 0.27 -0.49
1975-79 3.02 0.32 0.89 1.79
1980-84 0.39 0.78 0.96 -1.34
1985-89 6.37 1.19 3.24 1.82
1990-94 7.29 2.70 1.75 2.67
1995-99 5.35 3.44 0.53 1.32
2000-04** 3.69 2.04 0.81 0.79
1990-99 6.32 3.07 1.14 1.99
1970-04 3.83 1.66 1.20 0.93
1985-04 5.67 2.34 1.58 1.65
Source: Author’s calculations based on oﬃcial national
accounts. Assumptions: Labor share equal to 0.6 and
depreciation of capital equal 6%.
*Figures are geometric averages of yearly data and they
may not sum the total.
** The year 2004 is estimated.
The evidence shows that in two ﬁve-year periods, the early 1970s and the early 1980s,
TFP in Chile declined. This, however, reveals typical measurement problems, such as not
controlling for capacity utilization and labor hoarding, since it is unlikely that there was
any actual regression in the use of technology. Other studies, reviewed below, still show
negative TFP growth after controlling for the quality of capital and labor as well as capacity
utilization, although they do not control for utilization of employment. The table shows
the increase in the contribution of TFP growth since the mid-1980s: TFP growth reached
a maximum of 2.7 percent a year during 1990-94, which is quite high by international
standards.
An interesting feature of Chile’s economic growth record is the two distinct phases it
displayed in the golden period. The ﬁrst occurred in the second half of the 1980s, and the
second in the 1990s. In the ﬁrst phase, after the recovery from the recession of 1982, there
was a strong recovery of employment. Starting from about 30 percent in the crisis of 1982,
the unemployment rate declined to single digits toward the end of the decade. During the
second half of the 1980s, fully half of Chile’s GDP growth was explained by an increase
in employment. After unemployment declined to normal levels, TFP growth during the
1990s averaged 2 percent a year, not signiﬁcantly higher than its growth rate in the late
1980s. Its rate of growth in the second half of the 1980s was also very similar to that of
the 1990s as a whole (table 4). But, in contrast to the second half of the 1980s, during the
1990s almost half of the average growth rate of 6.3 percent a year was accounted for by the
accumulation of capital, sustained by record investment rates (gross ﬁxed capital formation
11in real terms), as shown in ﬁgure 3. The investment rate has since fallen back to about 24
percent in recent years. In summary, the main difference between the late 1980s and the
1990s is that the recovery of the late 1980s was based on employment expansion, whereas
that of the 1990s was an investment boom. Output growth and TFP growth were similar
in both phases.6 From table 4 we can conclude that the Chile’s rapid growth in the golden
period is explained mostly by the accumulation of factors, ﬁrst labor and later capital. In
contrast, TFP growth accounted for less than 30 percent of total growth, and in recent years
it has declined to about 20 percent.
Measurement issues aside, this evidence can have either an optimistic or a pessimistic
interpretation. On the negative side, it shows that TFP growth has not been the driving force
of the growth process; on the positive side, and as discussed below, there clearly remains
great potential to increase productivity and thus income.
To assess the robustness of these conclusions, table 5 presents estimates of TFP growth
from other studies, some of which adjust their measures of labor by hours and quality, and
of capital by quality and utilization. Beyer and Vergara (2002) and Gallego and Loayza
(2002) obtain results for TFP growth similar to those of this paper, whereas Fuentes et al
(2004) report values that are somewhat higher.7 Over all, however, a fair assessment is that
TFP growth over the last decade has been at most around 2 percent a year.
The ﬁgures on TFP growth provide a basis for a ﬁrst estimate of Chile’s growth poten-
tial. Since the neoclassical model predicts that, in the long run, growth in GDP per capita is
equal to TFP growth divided by the share of labor, one could extrapolate this result to pre-
dict potential growth per capita of the Chilean economy to be about 3.3 percent a year. If we
add the rate of growth of the population 15 years and older, which since 2000 has averaged
1.7 percent a year, potential growth in GDP can be estimated to be about 5 percent a year.
Of course, this estimate does not consider the potential for catch-up, which could increase
the contribution of TFP. As I discuss in section 5, an annual rate of growth of 5 percent is
fairly close to what other methods and studies show to be the long-run rate of growth in
Chile under current conditions. Any researcher looking at the data from the late 1990s, and
using an assumption of long-run TFP growth of 3 percent a year (the average for 1990-97
was 2.9 percent), would easily have concluded that long-run growth would be close to 6.7
percent a year, which with hindsight was based on an assumption of TFP growth that was
very high by both Chile’s own historical standards and international standards.
6 For a discussion of the macroeconomic policies that followed the recovery, see Corbo and
Fischer (1994).
7 The diﬀerences in average rates of growth are due to the use of arithmetic versus geometric
averages, but also to diﬀerences in the sources of data, and whether or not data from the revised
national accounts are used.
12Table 5: Alternative measures of TFP growth
Authors Period Output TFP Adjustments*
Growth Growth
Beyer and Vergara (2002) 1986-2001 6.0 1.72 No
Fuentes et al. (2004) 1990-2003 5.7 2.36 No
Gallego and Loayza (2002) 1986-2000 6.6 1.95 Yes
Fuentes et al. (2004) 1990-2003 5.7 2.47 Yes
This study 1985-2004 5.7 1.67 No
* Adjustments for utilization and quality of factors.
2.4 Income diﬀerentials
The above analysis of the sources of economic growth gives a reasonable picture of the
forces behind increases in income in Chile. However, there are at least two reasons why this
may not be the right way to decompose growth. First, the theory of economic growth refers
to differences in income rather than differences in growth rates, and second, from a more
practical point of view, we are interested in international comparisons, and for this reason it
is useful to explain differences of income across countries. By measuring gaps in the stock
of factors of production and in efﬁciency (TFP), we can explain income differences across
countries. For this purpose, I conduct here a “levels” decomposition. In this decomposition,
in contrast with the growth accounting previously presented, instead of looking at raw labor
I explicitly consider human capital. This becomes relevant because comparing levels of
income is important in controlling for differences in the quality of the labor force across
countries. I compare Chile’s income per capita with that of the United States, as is usually
done in the literature, and I decompose the difference between them into a productivity gap,
a capital-output ratio gap, and a human capital gap. I follow the decomposition suggested
by Hall and Jones (1999), which is similar to that of Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997).




where A is again TFP, K is physical capital, and H is labor adjusted for human capital. The
last of these can be rewritten as Lh, where L is employment and h is a measure of human
capital per worker. Using lowercase letters for per-capita (or, more properly, per-worker)


















13We could simply use this decomposition, but, as we know from growth theory, if there is a
productivity shock (that is, if A rises), this will lead to an increase in the capital-labor ratio
in the steady state, and therefore the increase in productivity will be wrongly attributed
to an increase in the capital-labor ratio. However, what remains invariant to a productivity
increase in the steady state is the capital-output ratio, which depends on the investment rate,
which in turn depends on the saving rate. Therefore an increase in investment will lead to
an increase in the capital-output ratio, but an increase in productivity will not.8
Rewriting equation (4) in terms of the capital-output ratio-that is, dividing and multi-






















The comparisons here done with respect to the United States (country i). Therefore, if
output per capita turns out to be Z percent of that of the United States, Za percent can be
explained by productivity differentials, measured as the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side
of equation (7), Zky percent by differences in the capital-output ratio, and Zh percent by
differences in human capital. By construction, then, (1+Z) = (1+Za)(1+Zky)(1+Zh).9
Finally, to measure human capital I use the traditional speciﬁcation based on the returns
to education per year of schooling:
h = eÁE; (8)
where E represents years of education and Á corresponds to the returns on schooling, which
can be estimated using Mincer equations.10 Following Hall and Jones (1999), the exponent
in equation (8) is assumed to be piecewise linear. For the ﬁrst four years of schooling I use
a return of 13.4 percent, which is the return to education in Africa. For the next four years
I use a return of 10.1 percent, and for years beyond that I use the return on schooling in
OECD countries, which is 6.8 percent.
The rest of the data are constructed in the same way as for the Solow decomposition
discussed previously. For the national accounts I use the Penn World Tables version 6.1
from Aten, Heston, and Summers (2002), in order to have internationally comparable data.
The results are presented in table 6. Chile’s GDP per capita in 2000 was only 39 percent that
of the United States when measured at PPP. The capital-output ratio in Chile was only 14
8 For a skeptical view of this approach, see Bosworth and Collins (2003), who argue that not all
increases in capital are the result of increases in TFP.
9The decompositions are constructed on a country by country basis, and therefore when tanking
averages across countries this identity may not hold.
10We have (1=h)(dh=dE) = Á, which is the return to schooling.
14Table 6: Level Decomposition, GDP per-capita 2000
Per capita Capital Output Human Capital Total Factor
GDP Ratio Productivity
Chile 0.389 0.863 0.694 0.649
[ 0.450 ] [ 0.560 ] [ 0.599 ]
Mexico 0.381 0.922 0.684 0.604
[ 0.413 ] [ 0.557 ] [ 0.631 ]
Korea 0.571 1.185 0.977 0.493
[ 0.482 ] [ 0.584 ] [ 1.158 ]
Asia-4 0.670 1.089 0.885 0.724
[ 0.640 ] [ 0.788 ] [ 0.963 ]
Latin America 0.212 0.728 0.581 0.430
[ 0.250 ] [ 0.313 ] [ 0.423 ]
Asia 0.260 0.960 0.768 0.339
[ 0.260 ] [ 0.325 ] [ 0.737 ]
Source: Author’s calculations based on Aten, Summers and Heston (2002).
Data in square brackets represent how much it would be the income diﬀerential if that factor
were equal to one.
percent lower than that in the United States, and human capital was 31 percent lower. The
largest difference is obtained for TFP, which was 35 percent lower than that of the United
States. ThereforethemostimportantfactorexplainingthedifferenceswiththeUnitedStates
is TFP, followed closely by human capital.11 This is consistent with the results from the
growth accounting, which shows that, despite reasonable levels of TFP growth, it does not
explain more than 30 percent of the rapid rate of growth that Chile has experienced since
the mid-1980s.
If Chilean TFP equaled that of the United States, the income gap would decline from
61 percent to only 40 percent; if instead the capital-output ratio were the same, the gap
would only decline to 55 percent. The same pattern is obtained for other countries; that
is, the largest share of the gap is due to efﬁciency (TFP), rather than factor quantities.
Hence the largest gains in terms of closing the income gap would be obtained by closing the
productivity gap, that is, by increasing efﬁciency in the use of existing factors of production,
in order to produce more with the same inputs. It is closely followed by low human capital.
The table also shows that the Asian miracle has been more the result of capital deepening
than of productivity enhancement, a point originally raised by Young (1995).
11The data on human capital are based exclusively on measures of the educational attainment
of the labor force and are not adjusted for quality. This is the implicit assumption when using
the same return for education across countries. As discussed later, there is evidence of low relative
quality of education in Chile, which would increase the human capital gap.
153 Long-Run Growth: Strengths
There has been an explosion of literature since the late 1980s on the determinants of eco-
nomic growth, made possible by the emergence of large databases on which to perform
cross-country comparisons, and by developments in the theory of economic growth.12 In
this section, rather than perform cross-country regressions, I identify those areas that are
important for economic growth in which Chile is strong. In addition, I discuss whether or
not these strengths existed before the golden period. This will help to elucidate what factors
helped in Chile’s take-off.
The advantage of this approach is that, rather than relying on a single set of regressions,
it allows for a broader view of a very abundant and useful literature. The problem with
cross-countryregressionsisthattheycannotincludeallthepossibledeterminantsofgrowth.
First, availability of data, degrees of freedom and collinearity in the data makes it difﬁcult to
include all potential candidates. In addition, theory in general does not give reasons for the
inclusion of all variables. For this reason, most researchers focus only on a certain number
ofvariablesstartingfromsomebenchmark, buttheyareunabletoprovideafull-assessment.
In addition, focusing on the details provide also scope for more accurate analysis.
Finally, I do not mean to imply that the areas discussed here as strengths lack the po-
tential for further improvement, but only that these areas cannot be blamed for less-than-
optimal growth performance.
3.1 Low inﬂation
Low inﬂation, or macroeconomic stability more broadly, is an important factor that allows
for more rapid growth.13 Inﬂation distorts the allocation of resources, diverts time and
talent away from productive activity toward efforts to protect against inﬂation, introduces
inefﬁciencies in the allocation of credit, and is a symptom of poor macroeconomic policies
and institutions. There is no evidence anywhere in the world of sustained rapid growth
occurring in a high-inﬂation environment.
TurningtoChile, theﬁrstpointtonoteisthatthereisabigdifferenceinaverageinﬂation
in Chile between the period before and the period after 1985; the difference is particularly
striking for the period since the mid-1990s, when Chile achieved sustained single-digit in-
ﬂation for the ﬁrst time since statistics have been kept. (Two previous periods of single-digit
inﬂation since the 1960s were short-lived, each lasting no more than two years. In addition,
both those periods, the early 1960s and the early 1980s, coincided with ﬁxed exchange rate
regimes that ended in collapse.) Between 1960 and 1990 the average annual inﬂation rate
(December to December) was 72 percent, although that average falls to 26 percent when
12See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) for a recent review of the evidence.
13De Gregorio (1992, 1996), Fischer (1993), and Barro (1997) ﬁnd that inﬂation has a signiﬁcant































Figure 4: Inﬂation in Chile: 1960-2004
the years of triple-digit inﬂation, 1972-76, are excluded. The history of inﬂation in Chile
since 1960 is presented in ﬁgure 4.
The persistent reduction of inﬂation started in 1990, and from 2000 to 2003 inﬂation
averaged only 2.8 percent. The decline of inﬂation was the result of three important fac-
tors. First, the independence of the Central Bank of Chile was granted by a constitutional
law in 1989, which establishes price stability and the normal functioning of the payments
system as its goals. The central bank has instrument, goal, and budget independence. It
is also prohibited from lending to the government. Second, ﬁscal consolidation, discussed
below, was also key in maintaining stability and avoiding inﬂationary ﬁnance through ﬁs-
cal dominance. Finally, no less important was growth itself. A long history of inﬂation
made the Chilean economy very resistant to efforts at disinﬂation. Lagged indexation was
widespread. Nominal wages, the center of the exchange rate band, regulated prices, and
other important values were all indexed to past inﬂation. In this context it would ordinar-
ily have been very difﬁcult to reduce inﬂation. However, Chile’s high rate of productivity
growth made the reduction of inﬂation possible despite indexation, since the latter ceased to
bind as growth increased (De Gregorio, 2004). Instead there was a virtuous circle between
inﬂation and growth, as low inﬂation became a factor that fostered growth, while growth
itself made the disinﬂation effort less painful.
Low and declining inﬂation has been both a positive factor in sustaining growth in Chile
and part of the explanation for Chile’s growth take-off. However, a problem of timing must
beaddressed: growthstartedin1985, butthereductionofinﬂationcamelater. Inthisregard,
17the hypothesis, noted above, that the late 1980s were more of a recovery period than one of
high persistent growth becomes more relevant. The late 1980s were a period when Chile
lacked access to foreign ﬁnancing and had a very depreciated real exchange rate. Once the
economy reached full employment, macroeconomic stability became more important. It is
difﬁcult to imagine how Chile could have maintained growth with double-digit inﬂation.
Currently, monetary policy in Chile operates within an inﬂation targeting framework,
where the central bank is committed to keeping inﬂation in a band between 2 and 4 percent
a year, converging to the center of the band over a two-year horizon. Keeping inﬂation low
and stable is a sound basis for monetary policy to contribute to long-run growth.
3.2 Sound ﬁscal policy
Fiscal policy has been another important factor in promoting economic growth, operating
through two channels. First, ﬁscal policy played a key role in achieving the low inﬂation
and macroeconomic stability just discussed. Second, the size of government has remained
at levels that have not inhibited economic growth.
Figure 4 shows the path of the ﬁscal deﬁcit since 1960.14 Until 1974 Chile had a per-
sistent ﬁscal deﬁcit. The ﬁrst turnaround came in the second half of the 1970s and was
followed by a relatively modest deterioration with the crisis of 1982. There was then a
12-year string of ﬁscal surpluses, followed by an even smaller deterioration in the slow-
down after 1998. In 2004 a return to ﬁscal surplus is expected at the central government
level. Therefore, like the anti-inﬂation policy, ﬁscal discipline has been not only a factor in
explaining Chile’s rapid growth, but also part of the explanation for the differences before
and after 1985. There have been ﬂuctuations in the budget, but ﬁscal consolidation clearly
took hold after the mid-1970s. This evidence shows that, beyond the contribution of ﬁscal
policy to moderating cyclical ﬂuctuations, the public sector made a strong contribution to
growth during the golden period and is one of the most evident sources of strength for future
growth.
Another indication of Chile’s ﬁscal conservatism is the level of public debt. Figure 6
compares gross central government debt across a number of mostly middle-income coun-
tries, revealing that Chile has a very low ratio of public debt to GDP. The continuous ﬁscal
surpluses of the late 1980s and most of the 1990s have resulted in a sharp decline in the
public debt. In 1989 the total debt of the consolidated public sector (central government
plus the central bank15) was 73 percent of GDP in gross terms and 40 percent of GDP on a
14The ﬁgures are not entirely compatible, but looking at diﬀerent sources they give a reasonable
proxy for the ﬁscal deﬁcit of the central government in the last 40 years. The ﬁgures are taken from
Velasco (1994) until 1986, and from oﬃcial (Ministry of Finance) sources thereafter. One of the
diﬀerences is that in the latter source the ﬁscal series are on an accrual basis, whereas the former
are on a cash basis.
15The debt of the central bank originated in the ﬁnancial crisis of 1982, and was later increased



































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Public debt in selected countries, 2002
net basis. The debt has declined sharply and persistently since then, and in 2003 gross debt
was only 34 percent of GDP, and net debt a mere 7 percent. Thanks to this achievement,
Chile has one of the lowest public debts among countries with full access to international
ﬁnancial capital. One result is that the interest rate spread between Chilean public debt and
U.S. Treasury bills is now below 100 basis points.
Currently, the rule of maintaining a cyclically adjusted (“structural”) ﬁscal surplus of
the central government of 1 percent of GDP has strengthened the commitment to ﬁscal
responsibility. It allows the operation of automatic stabilizers and the use of countercyclical
ﬁscal policy-something unusual among developing countries, and among Latin American
countries especially (Gavin and Perotti, 1997).
These international comparisons lead to a clear conclusion: Chile is one of the most
ﬁscally responsible countries in the world. But ﬁscal policy in Chile also has had another,
more structural impact on economic growth, by keeping the size of government relatively
small and maintaining a composition of government spending that favors growth. This re-
ﬂects the view that public investment, education, and certain other forms of spending are
good for economic growth, and that what is harmful for growth is nonproductive govern-
ment spending.
To provide a simple international comparison (and noting all the caveats and difﬁculties
attending such comparisons), ﬁgure 7 uses ﬁscal data from the 2004 World Development
IndicatorsoftheWorldBank. Giventhathigherincomepercapitaisassociatedwithalarger































































































































































































































Figure 7: Size of government: International comparisons
a number of countries against their GDP per capita, measured at current international prices
adjusted for PPP, and compares the size of Chile’s government with what its income level
would predict (as indicated by the regression line in each panel).16 The top two panels plot
total government expenditure and total current expenditure against GDP per capita. In both
cases the size of Chile’s government is about 5 percent of GDP below the level that one
would expect for a country with Chile’s income per capita. (A similar conclusion would
be obtained if we used a more narrow measure of expenditure, such as government ﬁnal
consumption on goods and services.) It follows that the size of Chile’s government cannot
have been detrimental for Chile’s growth.17
Thebottom twopanels ofﬁgure7 showthatthe composition of governmentexpenditure
in Chile is tilted in favor of growth. In the case of capital expenditure, the ﬁgure shows a
negative relationship with income per capita, and Chile is about where its level of income
would predict. However, given that the size of Chile’s government as a whole is somewhat
smaller than predicted, one can infer that the budget is more tilted toward public investment
than in other countries-a factor that should contribute positively to growth. Moreover, the
fact that Chile has an ambitious program of road privatization, implemented in the second
half of the 1990s, suggests that total investment in infrastructure is much higher than what
the ﬁgures for public investment reveal.
More deﬁnitive is the evidence regarding social expenditure. The bottom right panel
16The data in the ﬁgure are for 1998, although World Development Indicators has data until
2000. The results are not diﬀerent using 2000 data, but the international coverage is much smaller.
17This point has also been made by Barro (1999)
21of ﬁgure 7, shows that government expenditure on education, health, social security, and
welfare in Chile is high for the country’s level of income. To the extent that expenditure
on education and health improves the quality of human capital, it should be positively cor-
related with growth. In this ﬁgure, however, education and health expenditure is lumped
together with other social expenditure whose effect on growth is unclear.18 But, as dis-
cussed later, social expenditure in Chile has helped to compensate for the country’s unequal
income distribution. In addition, it is unlikely that the conclusions would change radically
if we could disaggregate these data, since public social security expenditure in Chile should
be relatively low on an international basis.19 The social security system was privatized in
the early 1980s, and current government expenditure in this area goes only to pay those
retirees who chose not to switch from the old pay-as-you-go system.
In summary, Chile’s net ﬁscal position, the limited size of its government, and the fa-
vorable composition of government expenditure have all provided a stimulus for economic
growth; they may also help to explain why the growth take-off occurred in the mid-1980s
and not before. Of course, improvements in the efﬁciency of government expenditure, a
continued commitment to keeping the size of government limited, and improvements in the
cyclical aspects of ﬁscal policy within a ﬁscal rule would further enhance Chile’s growth
potential.
3.3 Strong ﬁnancial sector
A well-functioning ﬁnancial system is key to channeling investible funds to efﬁcient invest-
ment projects, and the empirical evidence on economic growth shows that deep ﬁnancial
markets are good for growth (see, for example, Levine, 2004). Of course, a deep but poorly
regulated ﬁnancial system may be very bad for growth, since it can be a source or an am-
pliﬁer of crisis, and indeed Chile knows this from direct experience.
Chile undertook an ambitious process of ﬁnancial liberalization in the late 1970s. This
process, together with a ﬁxed exchange rate and inadequate prudential regulation, led to a
rapid increase in credit from the banking system to the private sector. The government’s
implicit guarantee of the banking system, the insurance provided by the commitment to a
ﬁxed exchange rate, and poor ﬁnancial regulation (especially the failure to properly regulate
connected lending) were key vulnerabilities of the ﬁnancial sector and of the economy as
a whole. This weakness led, in conjunction with a severe external shock in 1982, to a
deep currency and banking crisis, whose cost has been estimated at 35 percent of GDP
(Sanhueza, 1999).
The collapse of the ﬁnancial system set the stage for the banking law of 1986, later
amended in the 1990s.20 Perhaps one of the main reforms was to restrict lending to related
18Appropriately assigned, however, social expenditure should increase welfare.
19I am not aware of data to provide a full international comparison of social expenditure excluding
social security.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8: Financial System Strength Index
parties-such lending had been at the center of the crisis of 1982. In addition, several other
mechanisms were introduced to strengthen prudential regulation. These developments, plus
the recapitalization of the banking system, allowed the expansion of banking activities in a
less vulnerable ﬁnancial environment.
Currently, the strength of Chile’s banking system is rated at the top among emerging
markets. Figure 8 shows a recent ranking of countries’ banking systems. The ﬁgure is
based on Moody’s index of ﬁnancial system strength, computed in May 2004, converted
to an index from 0 to 100 by the IMF (2004, table 28) according to a numerical scale
assigned to Moody’s average rating by country. Chile’s ﬁnancial system is evaluated at a
level similar to that of industrialized countries. Out of 61 countries surveyed, Chile ranks
22nd, ahead of all other emerging markets. Likewise in terms of nonperforming loans,
returns on assets, and capital-assets ratios (not shown), Chile boasts some of the best scores
among all emerging markets.
The Chilean banking sector is very active in intermediating funds. Credit to the private
sector as a share of GDP is the highest in Latin America, reaching 65 percent in 2002, a
level similar to that of some industrialized countries. The ﬁnancial market in Chile has been
mostly based on banks. However, institutional investors, especially pension funds, which
manage a combined portfolio of about 50 percent of GDP, have also played an important
roleinthedevelopmentofChile’scapitalmarkets. Morerecently, lowﬁnancialcostsaswell
banking system, see Fuentes and Maquieira (2001).
23as new laws facilitating ﬁnancial development have led to the development of a large market
for corporate ﬁxed-income securities. New forms of ﬁnancing such as factoring, convertible
bonds, leasing, and commercial paper have also emerged. Finally, a law protecting minority
shareholders was enacted in the early 2000s to regulate public stock offers. All of these
innovations should promote Chile’s further ﬁnancial development, a key factor in ensuring
that good investment projects will have sufﬁcient funding.
Another positive aspect of Chile’s ﬁnancial development is its full integration with in-
ternational ﬁnancial markets. After a history of capital controls, all controls were removed
in 1999, as a result of developments in macroeconomic policy that, in addition to prudential
regulation involving the ﬁnancial system, introduced a ﬂexible exchange rate regime.
As in the case of monetary and ﬁscal policy, the strength and depth of the Chilean
ﬁnancial system dates from the mid-1980s. Hence Chile’s ﬁnancial development not only
provides the basis for future growth, but also helps explain the country’s take-off. However,
it would be an exaggeration to say that all is as well as could be hoped for in the ﬁnancial
system. As I will discuss later (section 3.5), one problem detected by the World Bank’s
recent survey of the ease of doing business in developing countries is the high cost of
creating collateral in Chile. This has not resulted in ﬁnancial underdevelopment, but is
clearly an area that could be improve to increase intermediation, specially for small and
medium enterprises, which are the ones that have more problems to raise collateral.
3.4 Openness to trade
The explosion of research in the late 1980s on the determinants of economic growth pro-
duced a wide range of disparate results, and most of the factors that were found to promote
growth have been questioned by subsequent research. But within this plethora of results, if
there is one issue that enjoys broad (but by no means total) consensus, it is that openness to
trade fosters economic growth. More-open economies have been able to grow faster than
closed ones. This is particularly important in periods of trade liberalization.21 In addition,
Winters et al. (2004), after a detailed review of the evidence, show that effectively openness
is associated with poverty reductions in the long run, and even there is a strong presumption
that this happen in the short run. Naturally, trade liberalization may also work with some
other policies to alleviate poverty. Therefore trade liberalization is good for the economy,
and it is advisable to undertake it right away. (The same cannot be said of other areas, such
as ﬁnancial liberalization.)
As documented in De Gregorio and Lee (2004), the single most important factor ex-
plaining differentials in growth rates between Latin America and East Asia in the last forty
years has been differences in the degree of openness. Of course, one can add many caveats-
the strategy of opening up matters, as does the institutional framework in which opening
21For a recent comprehensive review of the facts and additional evidence on the eﬀects of trade
liberalization, see Wacziarg and Welch (2003). See also Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Edwards
(1997). For a more skeptical view, see Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001).
24takes place-but it remains a fact that more-open economies grow faster than closed ones.
This lesson is especially important for small economies.
Moreover, the old idea that supported the import-substitution strategy in Latin America
in the 1960s, which held that opening to trade would result in developing countries produc-
ing “bad goods”-mostly commodities, whose terms of trade would be declining-has been
proved wrong. It is true that countries that face unfavorable terms of trade grow less rapidly,
but it is also true that there has not been such a deterioration of the terms of trade. Compar-
ing the relative performance of East Asian economies and Latin America, De Gregorio and
Lee (2004) found that the behavior of the terms of trade does not explain any signiﬁcant part
of the difference in growth performance. Inward-oriented industrialization has not been a
good idea.
The opening of the Chilean economy was one of the most important, if not the most
important, reforms undertaken by the military regime of the 1970s and 1980s. In 1973 the
average tariff was 100 percent, and there were multiple exchange rates in place, with a ratio
of 1 to 52 between the lowest and the highest rate. The process of trade liberalization that
followed the military takeover was rapid. By 1979 the tariff rate was already ﬂat at a level
of 10 percent.22 All nontariff barriers were eliminated, and the foreign exchange market
was uniﬁed.
After the debt crisis, there was a reversal of trade liberalization, starting in March 1983
and culminating in May 1985 with a ﬂat tariff at 35 percent. But within a couple of months
tariffs were again reduced, and they had fallen to 15 percent by 1990in 1988. In 1991 tariffs
were reduced to 11 percent, in what some regard as one of the most important signals of the
new democratic government’s commitment to trade opening. Starting in 1999, tariffs were
gradually reduced further, by 1 percentage point a year, from 11 percent to the current level
of 6 percent.
In the meantime Chile has signed a number of free trade agreements (FTAs) with its
trading partners. Indeed, except for Mexico, Chile has signed more FTAs than any other
country in the world. Chile’s interest in FTAs was ﬁrst made evident in the early 1990s,
when the intention to negotiate an FTA with the United States was announced. After the
Summit of the Americas in the early 1990s, talks toward an FTA for all of the Americas
was announced, but it has yet to be implemented. Chile signed a number of other FTAs in
the 1990s, and ﬁnally, in 2003, agreements with the United States and the European Union
were signed. These FTAs have resulted in reductions of Chile’s effective tariff below the
ﬂat ofﬁcial tariff rate. In 2004 the average tariff rate has been around 2.0 percent (see table
7).
Chile’s openness to trade has increased substantially over the years (ﬁgure 9). , so
that Chile is today very much integrated into the world economy. Total trade, measured
as exports plus imports in nominal terms, reached 70 percent of GDP in 2003, and it has
22There have always been some special exceptions, such as automobiles.
25Table 7: Tariﬀs (%)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
General 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 10.0 9.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 6.0
Eﬀective 9.5 8.9 7.9 7.7 7.1 6.1 5.2 4.5 2.7 2.0
averaged 60 percent of GDP since 1996.23
An important issue in Chile’s trade development has been its concentration in copper.
However, despite the great abundance of copper in Chile, its importance has diminished. As
ﬁgure 9 shows, from 1960 to 1975 copper accounted for about 70 percent of total exports,
but this share has declined to less than 40 percent in recent years. Other measures of export
concentration, such as Herﬁndahl indices, also show increased diversiﬁcation, although
Chile’s trade remains somewhat more concentrated than that of other countries (Villafuerte,
2004).
The continuing importance of copper exports in Chile is not the result of a stagnant
noncopper sector. On the contrary, investment in the copper industry was very active during
the 1990s, which resulted in an expansion of copper exports from 1.5 million metric tons
in 1990 to 4.8 million in 2003. Despite this positive development, the expansion of other
exports has been even more dynamic, and it is this expansion that accounts for the observed
decline in copper’s share. The volume of total exports grew at an annual rate of 8.1 percent
from 1990 to 2003.
As some economists, most notably Sachs and Warner (1995), have argued, an abun-
dance of natural resources may be a curse rather than a blessing. It may induce rent-seeking
activities, divert scarce factors such as physical and human capital from growth-enhancing
activities, or induce a real appreciation that may result in the contraction of other tradable
sectors. There is no evidence of these problems in Chile. Strong institutions, including
ﬁscal discipline, have avoided “voracity” effects. An educated labor force and full access to
international capital markets have kept investment in other activities from being hampered,
and the real exchange rate has remained at levels that have not prevented exports from tak-
ing off. In short, there is no evidence that Chile’s abundance of natural resources has been
detrimental to growth; on the contrary, it has increased the country’s income and welfare.24
Figure 10 demonstrates that Chile trades more for its size than any other Latin American
23The most recent data in the ﬁgure are based on national prices of 1986, which would overes-
timate the trade share, but regardless of the data source, the trend in the trade share is always
increasing.
24Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio (2002) argue that when natural resources shifts scarce human
capital away from growth-enhancing activities, the development of natural resources could reduce
growth, although not income. Chile’s level of human capital is above the one that triggers the
negative eﬀects, which does not imply that this level is enough. In the next section I show that
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Source: World development indicators, Department of Statistics of Taiwan, Singapore Statistics. All figures are
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Figure 10: Trade Shares in Selected Countries
country, and its trade-GDP ratio is similar to those of some Asian economies. Compared
with Asia (and as discussed in the next section), however, Latin America has relatively little
intraregional trade, and hence trade within the region does not provide much of a boost to
increasing trade. I know of no example of a small, relatively high income economy that is
not integrated with the rest of the world, and this fact alone argues that Chile needs to be
very open. Openness to trade affects growth positively through many channels: it allows the
absorption of knowledge, provides access to new and better technologies, and encourages
specialization and the exploitation of scale economies. But, in my view, which is naturally
based on the Chilean experience, two other factors are the most important. First, trade
opens up many new and unexpected business opportunities-it reveals comparative advan-
tages that the country’s entrepreneurs did not perceive when it was closed. Second, trade
forces domestic producers to be efﬁcient, not just in order to compete in world markets, but
also to survive in the presence of foreign-based competitors at home. And this efﬁciency
must extend not only to the production of goods, but also to a ﬁrm’s logistics, distribution,
quality controls, and so forth.
Some research has found that FTAs, especially those involving the United States and
Europe, have had only small effects on growth and welfare. This may be surprising given
the previous discussion.25 Most existing calibrations need to make strong assumptions
25The most recent calibration can be found in Chumacero et al. (2003). They ﬁnd that output
in steady state would increase by 1 percent, a result similar to that found in static simulations by
Coeymans and Larra´ ın (1994).
28about TFP gains or reductions in risk premiums in order to ﬁnd relevant (although still
small) effects. The technical reason is that calibrations basically simulate small reductions
in tariffs. However, there are many dynamic gains from trade that are not easy to calibrate,
such as the effects of increased efﬁciency and knowledge absorption. In addition, the pro-
cess of negotiating an FTA with industrialized countries involves a revision of a country’s
entire institutional setting, as well as the speciﬁc changes necessary to adapt to the new
agreements, and the impact of these changes is all too often ignored.
Finally, FTAs give open and guaranteed access to the largest and deepest markets in the
world. Because of this, Chile’s FTAs with the United States and the European Union, and
the new negotiations in Asia,26 have been among the most important policy initiatives of
the last 20 years.
3.5 Strong institutions and regulation of business
Agrowingliteraturehasemphasizedtheroleofinstitutionsandgovernanceaskeyfactorsin
fostering growth. Institutions that protect property rights and allocate resources efﬁciently
are key to encouraging the accumulation of human and physical capital as well as speeding
productivity growth. The allocation of talents within an economy is an important determi-
nant of its growth potential.27 An economy in which distortions encourage rent-seeking
behavior will induce effort to be devoted to nonproductive activities. The ability to en-
force contracts and to have stable rules of the game is also necessary for growth. Therefore
growth and prosperity will be supported by institutions that protect property rights and set
limits on government intervention.
A variety of indicators have been developed in an attempt to measure governance, the
quality of government, the ability to secure property rights, and other aspects of institu-
tional quality. I have already discussed certain other institutional features, such as the size
of government and the independence of monetary policy, that bear directly on traditional
economic variables. Here I will focus on two other aspects of good institutions. The ﬁrst
are the usual indicators related to governance, such as corruption, maintenance of the rule
of law, and expropriation risk. These can be thought of as institutional characteristics that
protect property rights. But, in addition, it is important that institutions encourage busi-
ness creation and entrepreneurship, and regulation of entry, labor market restrictions, and
the quality of government policies are relevant for inducing factor accumulation. For this
purpose I will look at the the “Doing Business Index” (DBI) recently put together by the
World Bank (2004). Although these indices are recent, looking at these and older data on
corruption as well as the rule of law allows us to see whether improvement in the quality of
Chile’s institutions can help explain the take-off of the mid1980s.
26Chile has already signed a FTA with South Korea.
27 For recent reviews see Acemoglu and others (2004) and Kaufmann and Kraay (2002). The
emphasis on geography as opposed to institutions is discussed in Sachs (2003); on the role of human




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 11: Index of Corruption 2003, Transparency International
Chile ranks as the 20th least corrupt out of 133 countries, a sample of which are pre-
sented in ﬁgure 11. The corruption index, which takes a value of 10 for the least corrupt
country, and 0 for the most corrupt, ranks countries according to the degree to which cor-
ruption is perceived to exist among public ofﬁcials and politicians. The only countries
that outperform Chile on the index are industrialized countries, and, except for Hong Kong
and Singapore, Chile ranks above all other Latin American and Asian economies and even
above some rich economies.
Similar rankings are obtained for the maintenance of rule of law index of the Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide. In 2000 Chile ranked 23rd out of 112 countries on this measure.
This index is available over a longer time span than the corruption index, with data going
back before 1985. The data for 1980 placed Chile 22nd out of 92 countries. There are no
comparable data for previous years, but Chile’s 1980 ranking is an indication that Chile
already had strong institutions even before the growth take-off; hence one cannot argue that
it was the buildup of strong institutions that helped spur growth after 1985.
Chile indeed has a long tradition of good institutions. The success of reforms during
General Augusto Pinochet’s regime was not only the result of good economic policies sup-
ported by a dictatorial government; rather, the existence of strong institutions was key to
this development and stands as a warning for countries that might consider rushing into
reforms without a sound institutional framework. Indeed, as Valenzuela (1994, p. 417)
says:
More broadly, the autonomy of the Chilean authoritarian state and its ca-
30pacity to institute change was, ironically, also aided by several factors directly
related to Chile’s long tradition of democratic policies. Chile’s armed forces
were unique on the continent ...
But it was not only Chile’s tradition of an apolitical military that facilitated
the implementation of dramatic reform measures. Chile’s open and competi-
tive politics had forged over several generations a relatively strong and efﬁcient
state, while fostering widespread respect for the rule of law ...Although the
military regime was forced to take measures to cut back on the bloated size
of state agencies, the high degree of probity, professionalism, and experience
in Chile’s public sector, including the courts and many state enterprises, con-
tributed to easing the reform process. Chilean obeyed the rules drawn up by
the new authorities, though many questioned the legitimacy of the rulers them-
selves. By contrast with the experience of many neighboring countries, pri-
vatization and reform schemes were executed with a minimum of corruption,
citizens paid their taxes, and private-sector actors quickly learned to adjust to
new regulations drawn up to correct the deﬁciencies of the early moves to open
up the Chilean economy.
Indeed, if Chile had had weak institutions, poor maintenance of the rule of law, and
rampant corruption in the early 1970s, the orientation of the military government might
well have been very different. The episode likely would have ended as did the corrupt
dictatorships elsewhere in the region, with a lack of progress in all areas.
In fact, Chile had an institutional basis suitable for introducing free market reforms,
and the reforms endured. However, strong institutions and efﬁcient government are not
enough by themselves to foster investment and growth. Those institutions must also provide
incentives for factor accumulation and productivity growth. Institutions have to secure
property rights, and this was perhaps one of the main problems that the ﬁrst democratic
government after Pinochet faced. There was uncertainty about how committed the new
government was to an stable and open market economy, and for this reason the reduction
of tariffs, the maintenance of ﬁscal responsibility, and the other pro-market policies of the
early 1990s were key in gaining credibility. The initial years of democracy set the basis
for the record investment rates and rapid productivity growth of the 1990s, following the
recovery phase of the late 1980s, which focused on the recovery of employment. Efﬁcient
and strong institutions secured property rights, promoted an open market economy, and
provided the social infrastructure for further growth.
Important progress has been made in recent years in the measurement of institutional
quality. From an investor’s point of view, it is important to evaluate risks and costs when
investing in different countries. But it is also important, from the policy point of view,
to know, within a comparative perspective, the main weakness and strengths of a country
contemplating policy reforms. Since the work of Djankov et al. and others (2002) and of
the World Bank on the regulation of entry and the start-up costs of business, the data have
evolved into what today is the Doing Business report of the World Bank. This report con-
31Table 8: Doing Business, Top 36 Countries
1 New Zealand 10 Japan 19 Belgium 28 Russian Feder.
2 Singapore 11 Switzerland 20 Latvia 29 Samoa
3 United States 12 Sweden 21 Ireland 30 Korea, Rep.
4 Norway 13 Puerto Rico 22 Taiwan 31 Tonga
5 Canada 14 Denmark 23 Austria 32 Botswana
6 Hong Kong 15 Lithuania 24 France 33 Solomon Islands
7 Australia 16 Netherlands 25 Kiribati 34 South Africa
8 United Kingdom 17 Armenia 26 Germany 35 Estonia
9 Finland 18 Fiji 27 Thailand 36 Chile
siders seven categories, each of which contains a number of different items, with data for a
universe of 145 countries. The indicators are constructed on the basis of surveys, with stan-
dardized questions addressed to a group of lawyers and business practitioners. Countries
can be ranked on each category, and since they report qualitative indicators of regulation
and institutions, I construct indices that are the average ranking in a set of indicators. For
each category I compute the average ranking and construct a new ranking based on that
average. For the overall ranking I use the average of the average ranking in each category.
Chile ranks 36th in the overall ranking; table 8 lists the top 36 countries. As on the
other variables presented here, Chile is the top-ranked Latin American country; it also ranks
above most Asian countries and above many industrialized countries. Chile’s rankings in
each category and subcategory are presented in table 9. On several indicators-including
the ease with which one can start a business, register property, hire and ﬁre workers, pro-
tect investors, and enforce contracts-Chile ranks high. With respect to getting credit and,
especially, closing a business, however, Chile performs less well, in particular in certain
subcategories.28
In the area of credit, and perhaps surprisingly given the depth and strength of the bank-
ing sector discussed above, the main handicap is the cost of creating collateral. This index
estimates how much it costs to create and register collateral, as a percentage of income per
capita; in the case of Chile the cost is 5.3 times income per capita. To construct this cost,
all participants were asked to evaluate the cost of creating collateral of a standard busi-
ness, including taxes, notary fees, and duties associated with the creation and registry of
the collateral. Some countries have no registry, and so the cost could be low, but the uncer-
tainty that creditors face may be greater. One item on which Chile’s institutions are weak
is the recovery rate on business closures. The recovery rate measures how many cents on
the dollar creditors typically recover from an insolvent ﬁrm, and is directly associated with
28The reason that a country’s ranking for a given category could be worse than any of its subcat-
egory rankings has to do with the distribution of rankings and the fact that, for some items, many
countries have the same ranking.
32weaknesses in bankruptcy laws.29Chile ranks 89th on this index, with an average recovery
of 19 cents on the dollar. The top 31 countries all have recovery rates above 50 cents on the
dollar,30 which illustrates both Chile’s need for improvement and the beneﬁts that improved
bankruptcy procedures would bring.
In several other categories Chile ranks in the 20s to the 50s. One of these is the time
required to complete various procedures, such as registering property, enforcing contracts,
and closing a business. Ensuring a prompt bureaucratic response would also help improve
the environment for doing business in Chile. Finally, Chile has a very ﬂexible labor market,
but ﬁring costs are comparatively high. Indeed, ﬁring a worker with a regular contract in
Chile requires one month of severance pay for each year the employee has worked for the
ﬁrm, with a cap of 11 years. There has been much discussion in recent years about labor
market ﬂexibility and its impact on growth in Chile, but solid evidence is elusive. For ex-
ample, Calder´ on and Chong (2003) ﬁnd mixed results for the link between labor market
regulation (its ﬂexibility, the number of regulations, and enforcement) and growth. How-
ever, I believe that the important issue, given Chile’s current standing, should be poverty
alleviation and employment. For example, given recent reforms and proposals for reform,
the relevant issue is to what level the long-run rate of unemployment will ultimately con-
verge, and how the poor and the unskilled will be able to ﬁnd jobs.
Progress can still be achieved in many areas, even those in which Chile’s ranking is
relatively poor, and progress is all the more relevant for the future given that Chile will
have to compete with countries that also have good institutions. Over all, however, Chile
already has good institutions and a good regulatory environment for doing business. This is
conﬁrmed by many other evaluations and rankings. For example, on the Competitiveness
Index of the World Economic Forum, and on the Economic Freedom index of the Heritage
Foundation, Chile consistently achieves top rankings among developing countries.
3.6 Infrastructure: Strong Investment and Insuﬃcient Stock
A series of studies have focused on the role of public investment in promoting economic
growth. The ﬁrst important work in this area was that by Aschauer (1989), who found that
the stock of public infrastructure is an important determinant of TFP growth. In a more
recent series of papers, Calder´ on and Serv´ en (2004a, 2004b) have revisited this issue with
a large, carefully constructed database for international comparisons. They show that the
stockandqualityofinfrastructureareindeedimportantdeterminantsoftherateofeconomic
growth. The main variables they have explored are indicators of telecommunications, en-
29Bergoeing et al. (2002) argue that one important factor in the recovery of the 1980s was the
modiﬁcation of the bankruptcy law in 1982. This is not inconsistent with the evidence here, since
the reforms of 1982 represented important progress; rather, the evidence reported here highlights
the weaknesses still present in the bankruptcy procedures regarding recovery rates.
30The rate of recovery in the top 15 economies (Japan, Singapore, Finland, Taiwan, Canada,
Ireland, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Latvia, Spain, Hong Kong, South
Korea, and Australia) is above 80 cents on the dollar.
33Table 9: Chile’s Ranking per-Category
Starting business 19 Getting Credit 61
Number of procedures 8 Cost to create collateral 33
Duration 22 Legal rights index 7
Cost 32 Credit information index 1
Minimum capital 1
Registering Property 16 Enforcing contracts 30
Number of procedures 6 Number of procedures 14
Time 24 Time 36
Cost 11 Cost 27
Closing a business 111 Hiring and Firing Workers 15
Time 48 Rigidity of employment 8




ergy, and roads. In addition, they show that an increase in the stock of public infrastructure
reduces income inequality.
A large number of variables can be used to measure the stock of infrastructure as well
as its quality. These variables are in general correlated: for example, countries that have
good telecommunications infrastructure tend also to have good electric power generating
capacity. To facilitate reliable comparisons in cross-country analysis, Calder´ on and Serv´ en
(2004a) construct two synthetic indices, one for the stock of infrastructure and the other for
its quality. Each index corresponds to the ﬁrst principal component of a set of indicators.31
I will use their dataset to present a summary of the evidence.
The aggregate index of infrastructure stock is constructed on the basis of proxies for
infrastructure in telecommunications (number of telephone lines per worker), power gener-
ation (generating capacity in gigawatts per worker), and roads (length of the road network,
normalized by the country’s area). These three variables are highly correlated across coun-
tries, and the ﬁrst principal component explains 81 percent of its variability. The aggregate
index of infrastructure quality is computed in a similar way, using the following indicators:
waiting time for a telephone line, transmission and distribution losses as a percentage of
total electric power production, and paved roads as a share of the total road network.
Figure 12 plots these indices of the stock and quality of infrastructure for Chile for the
period since 1971. The ﬁgure also shows the world averages for the two indicators and the
31In simple terms, given a set of correlated variables, principal components analysis transforms
the data in another, uncorrelated set of variables, where the ﬁrst principal component is the one
that accounts for most of the variability in the data.
34values predicted for Chile given its level of income. The predicted values are smoothed
with a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter to remove business cycle inﬂuences. Growth of Chile’s stock
of infrastructure was very slow during the 1970s and especially the 1980s, but faster than
what would have been predicted given the country’s low rate of growth. The stock of
infrastructure increased continuously during the 1990s, at a rate faster than that for the
world as a whole. Where progress has been more impressive is in terms of quality. After a
decline in the quality of infrastructure during the 1980s, in the world and more drastically
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Figure 12: Stock and Quality of Infrastructure
Was public investment responsible for the take-off? Although public investment cannot
explain the recovery of the late 1980s (which, as discussed in the context of the growth de-
compositions in section 2.3, had little to do with investment), it was a key factor supporting
growth in the 1990s. First of all, growth in public investment paralleled that of output, so
that it did not present a bottleneck to further growth. In addition, the impressive improve-
ment in quality must have had an important impact on TFP growth. Finally, investment
in infrastructure was an important vehicle for foreign direct investment, which also had
important spillovers on growth during the 1990s. However, it is important to clarify that
infrastructure investment helps to explain the sustainability of the take off during the 90s,
but the stock of infrastructure, ad argued next, is still insufﬁcient.
Thus Chile has seen notable improvements in its infrastructure over time. But how
does Chile compare from an international perspective? To answer this question I compare
the synthetic indices of infrastructure quantity and quality for Chile in 2000, the latest
year available for Chile, with those of all countries for which data are available for that
year. The comparison is made both with and without adjustment for level of income, for
a sample of about 100 countries, the exact number depending on the indicator in question.
On this comparison, Chile ranks 48th on the gross quantity indicator, and 49th when the
data are adjusted for income. Therefore the stock of infrastructure in Chile is close to the
35world average.32 Similar rankings are obtained when comparing quality: when the data are
adjusted for income, Chile ranks 57th.
In summary, the evidence indicates that the decade of the 1990s was marked by an
extraordinary increase in infrastructure in Chile. This growth involved not only public in-
vestment, but also substantial private sector involvement, which fostered a surge in foreign
direct investment. The surge in investment, in turn, not only affected Chile’s long-term
growth potential, but also gave a short-term boost to domestic activity. From an interna-
tional perspective, this effort helped Chile catch up with the world average after a long
period of weakness in infrastructure. International comparison also reveals, however, that a
gap remains between Chile and the more advanced developing countries, such as the East
Asian economies, in terms of both the stock and the quality of infrastructure. For this rea-
son, the pick up of investment was a strength in the 90s, but still the stock can be improved.
4 Long-Run Growth: Weaknesses
I have already reviewed some of the institutional factors that may hamper growth in Chile,
such as the low level of assets recovered when closing a business, and the high cost of
creating collateral, or still some progress that can be done in infrastructure. In this section,
however, I will point out some other, broader concerns that may hinder future growth.33 As
in the previous section, I do not base the choice on any particular set of evidence, but rather
on a broad empirical look at the developments of recent years.
4.1 Research and development
Countries that devote a larger share of GDP than others to research and development (R&D)
tend to grow faster (Lederman and Maloney, 2003). R&D allows countries to adopt better
technologies and to provide new and better goods, and the fruits of this activity spill over to
the rest of the economy. Figure 13 provides a ﬁrst look at the data, showing expenditure on
R&D as a share of GDP for Chile and for selected country groupings. Chile has always had
a low level of R&D expenditure, and the increase since 1980 has been meager compared
with the East Asian countries, and even compared with the world average. The most recent
data from the OECD show that Chile, with R&D expenditure of 0.54 percent of GDP,
spends less on R&D than the average of a sample of developing countries (0.7 percent of
GDP).34 This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed by the evidence of Lederman and Saenz (2003).
Clearly, however, an income effect is at work here. One would expect that, as an econ-
omy becomes richer and better endowed with human capital, it can afford to spend more on
R&D. Figure 14 shows that, when R&D expenditure as a ratio to GDP is adjusted for coun-
try income, Chile’s level of R&D is very close to what one would expect for its income.
32For a precise comparison, one would like to control for other country characteristics, such as
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Figure 13: R&D Expenditure (% of GDP)
(The data in ﬁgure 14 are from 1995, because later data are unavailable for many countries,
but the results are almost the same for a much smaller sample for 2000.) Nevertheless,
increased spending on R&D would surely help the country grow faster. Indeed, according
to Lederman and Maloney (2003), increasing R&D expenditure by half a percentage point
of GDP would raise GDP growth by 0.3 or 0.4 percentage point a year.
The composition of R&D in Chile is very different from what one typically ﬁnds in
the rest of the world, which raises the question of whether that composition is efﬁcient. In
2000 about 55 percent of Chilean R&D expenditure was in basic science, as opposed to
applied research. In the industrialized countries and in the East Asian countries, this share
is generally between 10 and 20 percent. There is no reason to think that basic science would
be more growth-enhancing than applied research in Chile; indeed, the presumption would
be the opposite.
Figure 15 shows the sectoral breakdown of R&D expenditure in Chile and in other
developing as well as industrialized countries. The share of private R&D expenditure is
relatively low in Chile, only 26 percent, compared with 70 percent in the OECD countries
see Calder´ on and Serv´ en (2004b), which conﬁrms the discussion in the text.
33In Ministerio de Hacienda (2004) there is a useful and detailed discussion on two topics that I
cover in this section: R&D and quality of education.
34To avoid overrepresenting countries with very high R&D expenditure, I exclude high spenders
from Asia and Europe, as well as Brazil, which spends about 1 percent of its GDP on R&D. For
























Figure 14: R&D Expenditure and Income, 1995
on average.35 could be At the other extreme, and consistent with the data on the share of
research in basic science, Chile ranks ﬁfth in the share of R&D expenditure by institutions
of higher education: that share is 45 of the total, which is twice the world average. Gov-
ernment expenditure, at 29 percent of the total, is somewhat above the world mean of 22
percent. The policy lesson is straightforward. Chile should try to increase its R&D expen-
diture, and the additional spending should be devoted mainly to applied R&D, performed
by the private sector.36
4.2 Inequality and policy distortions
Theory as well as empirical evidence suggests that an unequal income distribution is bad
for growth, although some recent evidence has challenged this view. Rather than attempt
to resolve this debate, it may be more fruitful here to explore the speciﬁc mechanisms
through which inequality might affect growth. Indeed, the theoretical literature emphasizes
that inequality can lead to inefﬁcient policies that actually harm growth, in an attempt to
compensate for that inequality. The classic case is the introduction of inefﬁcient taxation
for purposes of redistribution.
De Gregorio and Lee (2004) found that, after adjusting for the level of development,
countries with more unequal income distributions, as measured by the Gini coefﬁcient, are
more likely to have characteristics and policies that are bad for growth. For example, they
35However, the ﬁgures for OECD countries could be somewhat overstated, since many countries
have R&D subsidies, which results in an incentive to declare more expenditure as R&D.
36How ﬁrms invest in R&D is also relevant. For example, licensing could be a cheap and eﬀective
mechanism to acquire technology. Alvarez et al. (2002) have been shown that in the case of Chile
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Source: OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2003.
Figure 15: R&D Expenditure by Sector
have lower school enrollment rates, probably because, after controlling for average income,
they have a larger fraction of the population that cannot afford to go to school. We also
found that countries with greater inequality have higher fertility, larger governments, lower
levels of educational attainment, and weaker institutions.
Although policymakers will in general prefer policies that both increase growth and
reduce inequality, this is not always the case. Some instead adopt redistributive policies
that introduce distortions, and fail to adopt other policies, such as universal education for
the poor, that have positive effects on growth and inequality. Since the poor will have less
incentive to acquire education, an active policy to encourage schooling will be good for
growth and for reducing inequality.
What I want to do here is compare the forecast for a given variable that affects growth,
after adjusting for the level of income, with the actual level of that variable for Chile, plotted
against the level of inequality. This is similar to the above exercise comparing Chile’s size
of government with what would be predicted for its level of income. The four variables
I explore are those examined by De Gregorio and Lee (2004): education (measured by
the enrollment rate), fertility, size of government (measured by government expenditure on
goods and services), and quality of institutions (measured by an index of the maintenance
of the rule of law).
Figure 16 presents the results of this comparison. The ﬁrst point to emphasize is that
Chile has a comparatively unequal income distribution as measured by the Gini coefﬁcient.
Indeed, the Gini for Chile is among the highest in the world. The top left panel of the ﬁgure
relates inequality to secondary school enrollment and shows a negative relationship. After
39adjusting for income, however, secondary school enrollment in Chile is higher than what
the country’s level of inequality would predict (shown in the straight line). This points to
a positive role of educational policies, which have raised enrollment above what would be
expected for Chile’s level of income.
A similar pattern is observed for fertility, as shown in the top right panel. It is known
that higher fertility results in slower growth in income per capita, and the ﬁgure shows a
positive relationship between fertility rates and inequality. Again, however, once fertility is
adjusted for income, Chile’s fertility rate is lower than would be predicted for its level of
inequality. Many factors may account for this, especially health conditions and education.
The relationship between the size of government and inequality, shown in the bottom
left panel, is somewhat weaker,37 and in this case Chile appears to fall exactly at the level
predictedforthisrelationship. Finally, thebottomrightpanelshowsthat, foragivenlevelof
income, countries with greater inequality have weaker institutions: maintenance of the rule
of law declines with greater inequality (similar results are obtained for other institutional
indicators, such as corruption). On this measure, however, Chile scores well above what
one would predict given its level of inequality. Maintenance of the rule of law in Chile,
adjusted for income, is at the level observed in countries with very low inequality.
Over all, although Chile does have a high level of inequality, the evidence reported here
shows that Chile has largely avoided the distortions that often hamper growth in countries
with similar levels of inequality. Of course, this has been demonstrated only for a limited set
of factors for which we have international empirical evidence. However, other experience
shows that the trade-off between efﬁciency and inequality is ever-present in public policy
and cannot be avoided. An example is the minimum wage.
Since the early 1990s, in an effort to improve the living conditions of the poor, Chile has
legislated signiﬁcant increases in the minimum wage. During the ﬁrst part of the decade,
output, productivity, and wages were growing strongly, and so there were no noticeable ad-
verse effects of the increased minimum wage on employment. In 1998, however, just as the
economy began to slow, a further large increase in the minimum wage was implemented;
also, for the ﬁrst time, minimum wages were set for three years, with increases of around
10 percent a year. Before then, minimum wages had been set every year in a tedious bar-
gaining process, and so the idea of having a long-term agreement sounded attractive. But
no provision was made for contingencies, and with the slowing economy, the minimum
wage ended up growing faster than the average wage for unskilled workers. By mid-1998
the minimum wage was about 45 percent of the average wage for unskilled workers, and
by mid-2000 that ratio had increased to 60 percent. And this happened at precisely the
time when the economy was most in need of wage moderation. The higher minimum wage
has been shown to be an important cause in the slowdown in employment growth in recent
37Although the approach taken here is a very simple one, it appears that the true relationship
between government expenditure and inequality is nonlinear and depends on the level of income,
especially since, contrary to the distributive politics argument, inequality and size of government







































































































































































































Figure 16: Inequality and Distortions
years, which was higher among unskilled workers (Cowan and others, 2003).
Finally, growth itself helps in the implementation of good policies. Inequality is only
one aspect of a country’s living conditions, and in a country with a fairly unchanged in-
come distribution from 1987 to 2003, a period of doubling income per capita is also a
period of doubling of the incomes of the poor. Indeed, the poverty rate in Chile declined
over this period, from 45 percent of the population to 19 percent. This has allowed public
policy to focus on alleviating poverty without creating signiﬁcant distortions in economic
growth. Although a country’s income distribution changes slowly, and no recipe for dra-
matic change in the distribution is available (except massive populist redistribution, which
is unadvisable), growth can reduce the distortions that inequality imposes on policies and
institutions.
4.3 Quality of education
Chile has high levels of school enrollment, and progress over the decades has been very
encouraging. Currently, the level of education of Chile’s labor force is consistent with the
country’s level of income. However, there is evidence that the quality of education is not as
good as the country’s high enrollment rates would suggest.38
Chile participated in the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS), which sought to
directly measure the quality of a country’s working-age population rather than that of its
students. As it happened, Chile, which was the only participating Latin American country
(besides the high-income countries, only Chile and a couple of middle-income European
countries took part), turned in the poorest performance. This, of course, reﬂects differences
38For further discussion of levels and quality of education, see Tokman (2004).
41in income, and indeed the worst performers were the countries with the lowest incomes per
capita. However, there is evidence that, even after adjusting for income, Chile still performs
poorly. Chile also participated in the Third International Mathematics and Science Study
(TIMSS) in 1999. On both tests Chile’s score was in the lowest quintile. According to
Barro (1999), Chile’s science score was 24 percent, compared with a sample mean of 46
percent. Given Chile’s level of income, its score should have been 43 percent.
Other results of quality are provided by the Programme for International Student As-
sessment of the OECD. This program administers a test of reading comprehension for stu-
dents age 15. Figure 17 plots the test results for each country against its expenditure in
education and draws a logarithmic trendline through the data. The ﬁgure shows that, given
its level of expenditure on education, Chile’s performance is low. Although these poor re-
sults suggest a low quality of education, they could be due to other factors. Villafuerte
(2004) shows that educational attainment for Chile is in line with its level of income, but
the TIMSS results, consistent with Barro (1999), are low. But Barro also shows that these
poor results are in part explained by income inequality.
In summary, it is clear that the quality of education in Chile is low, but this may be
the result either of inefﬁcient education expenditure, or of high income inequality, or both.
More research needs to be done to separate these effects. Estimates suggest that increasing
the quality of education can offer quite a large boost to economic growth. Barro (1999)
estimates that if Chile increased its average educational quality to the level it should have,
given its per capita income, growth would increase by 2 percentage points; although Barro
also notes that that estimate is implausibly large, it does illustrate the potential payoffs from
increasing the quality of education.
Finally, it is important to point out that the payoffs of improving quality of education
take time to deliver signiﬁcant results. The children that today could receive good educa-
tion, will be a large proportion of the labor force in about 20 more years. Te same lags has
education on income distribution. For this reason is important lo also look for improving
abilities of people already in the labor force through training programs. However, despite
these lags on the effects of education, improving its quality is a powerful tool for equalizing
opportunities, and for integrating poor families to the beneﬁts of economic progress.
4.4 Regional trade
The ﬁrst trading partners a country should have are its neighbors. Distance, language, and
culture should be the basis for integration into the world economy. Even when neighboring
economies have similar structures, intra-industry trade can help to increase the basis for
trade. Unfortunately, intraregional trade in Latin America is low, as is evident from ﬁgure
18. The ﬁgure, which draws on United Nations direction of trade data, shows the share of






















Figure 17: Eﬃciency of Education Expenditure
the total, and although it has increased in recent years, it remains comparatively low. Trade
among the South American countries is 24 percent of their total trade, and that among
all Latin American countries is 17 percent, the lowest among the regions shown in the
ﬁgure. The same pattern of low integration emerges for other country groupings such as
Mercosur or Aladi (not shown). These ﬁndings stand in sharp contrast to the dynamic
intraregional trade among the East Asian countries: already in the 1960s about 26 percent
of these countries’ trade was with each other, and that ﬁgure has increased to 50 percent in
recent years. Trade among the industrialized countries has long been an important share of
their total trade.
A variety of structural and geographical reasons could explain this low level of trade
among Latin American countries. For example, the opening up of a very large East Asian
country, China, may explain much of the increase in intraregional trade in that region. Latin
America, too, has a large country that could become an important promoter of regional
trade, but Brazil has yet to fulﬁll that role.
It may be that Latin America is a region where the incentives for trade are presently
lacking. There have been many attempts at integration-including the Pacto Andino, Aladi,
andmore recentlyMercosur-andintraregionaltrade hasincreased modestlysince the1960s.
But it is difﬁcult to argue that this increase has been the result of these arrangements, rather
than simply a reﬂection of the trend increase in trade around the world. Formal regional
agreements may help, but they are far from being a sufﬁcient stimulus to intraregional trade.
In my view, institutions play a key role in fostering trade. For countries to develop deep
and extensive trade relations, each must demonstrate at home the ability to enforce con-
tracts, to maintain the rule of law, and to establish enduring trade relations. The existence
of a stable macroeconomic environment is also important, because it reduces uncertainty
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Figure 18: Intraregional Trade
rent macroeconomic crises, and this impedes the growth of trade linkages. Recent trade
disputes-some of which, such as the problems over natural gas with Argentina and Bolivia,
have affected the Chilean economy-bear witness to these obstacles. Therefore, low intrare-
gional trade is not the deep problem, but a reﬂection of weak institutional setting to sustain
high trade in the region. A more dynamic region could certainly help to stimulate growth.
5 Growth Prospects
Many studies and reports have attempted, using different methodologies, to forecast long-
run growth for the Chilean economy. A sample of these studies is summarized in table 10.
The different studies use basically three methods. The ﬁrst is traditional growth accounting
along the lines of that presented in section 2.3. In this case, the forecast is based on certain
assumptions: some estimate of the expansion of labor, some investment rate from which the
rate of growth of capital can be derived, and ﬁnally some path for TFP. A second method
consists in using time-series techniques such as the popular Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter or other
more sophisticated methods. This ﬁltering strategy is sometimes used in combination with
growth accounting to smooth factor accumulation and TFP growth. Finally, the results
from estimations of cross-country regressions, where some assumption has to be made to
forecast the determinants of growth, can be used to forecast potential growth. In addition,
the table presents the estimations of Consensus Forecast (2003), which is based on surveys
of forecasters’ opinions.
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Source Projection Period Method
(% per year)
Barro (1999) 4.7 1996-2006 CCR
De Gregorio and Lee (1999) 5.4 1995-2005 CCR
Coeymans (1999)* 4.7 2001-2008 GA
Gallego and Johnson (2001) 5.0 2000 TS and GA
Hviding (2001) 5.5 2001-2010 TS and GA
de la Cuadra (2002) 4.0 long run
Gallego and Loayza (2002) 5.3 2001-2010 CCR
Loayza et al. (2002) 5.7 2000-2010 CCR
Consensus Forecast (2003) 4.8 2004-2013 Survey
De Gregorio and Lee (2004) 4.7 2000-2010 CCR
Average 5.0
CCR: cross-country regressions. TS: time series. GA: growth accounting.
When a study provides more than one estimate the average is taken.
* Estimates that considers 1.5% of labor and 2% growth of TFP.
Several of the papers summarized in table 10 forecast GDP per capita; to convert this to
GDP, I add 1.7 percent, which is the average rate of growth of the population 15 years and
older for recent years in Chile. The highest estimate is that of Loayza and others (2002), at
5.7 percent a year, and the lowest that of de la Cuadra (2002) at 4 percent; all the others lie
in a range between 4.7 and 5.4 percent. The average of the estimates is 5 percent. This is
the same ﬁgure presented in section 2.3as a prediction of long-run growth based on a rate
of productivity growth of 2 percent in the steady state of the neoclassical growth model.
A rate of growth of 5 percent would, of course, be below that of the golden period, and
below what appears to be the desired rate of growth for Chile, 6 to 7 percent, that one reads
in the press. But, taking all of Chile’s strengths and weaknesses into account, this seems a
reasonable forecast. The implied rate of growth for GDP per capita, at 3.3 percent, is higher
than that observed for the whole of the 20th century in any country in the world, although
below the rate of growth of certain “miracle” periods, like the golden period in Chile. Over
a longer horizon it would be a very healthy rate of growth, indeed more than twice as high
as what Chile itself experienced for the 20th century as a whole. Growth of 3.3 percent
a year over a period of 30 years would raise income per capita by 165 percent, whereas
growth at 1.7 percent a year would raise it by only 65 percent.
However, two caveats need to be considered when looking at these forecasts. The ﬁrst
is that Chile’s past success has reduced the income gap between Chile and the richest coun-
tries, so that the convergence effect will be negative. This refers to the fact that richer
countries grow more slowly, since the marginal productivity of capital declines as income
rises. Chile is certainly much richer today than it was in 1985, and hence the potential rate
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caveat is that any cross-country regression would have underestimated Chile’s growth dur-
ing the golden period. This implies that there is no way of accounting for all of the high rate
of growth achieved during that period. For example, the most comprehensive study looking
at this period using growth regressions, that of Gallego and Loayza (2002), cannot fully
explain Chile’s take-off. In fact, their base regressions explain less than half of the increase
in the rate of growth since the mid-1980s. In an expanded regression, using additional vari-
ables and interaction terms, they are able to reduce the forecast error, but they still explain
only three-quarters of the increase. As expected, there are factors not included in growth
regressions that help to explain such growth spurts. This is corroborated in studies that in-
clude more countries. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) show that countries with very slow
growth have been forecast to grow in per capita terms at a rate of 0 percent a year, yet in the
event actually decline at a rate of 1 percent. At the other extreme, some high-growth coun-
tries have been forecast to grow at a rate of 3.9 percent yet actually achieved growth of 4.8
percent. Thus errors of 1 percentage point are common among extreme growth experiences.
In the case of Chile, the fact that cross-country regressions cannot fully explain the
golden period shows the limitations of focusing on only a single set of regressions with a
limited set of regressors. However, a neutral projection of these unknown factors would
set them equal to zero. In an optimistic scenario, Chile could grow 1 percentage point
faster than forecast on a permanent basis, as the evidence shows is possible for high-growth
countries, reaching a rate of 6 percent a year.
In forecasts using cross-country regressions, Chile is still projected to be one of the
fastest-growing countries in the region; only very small, poor countries have forecast rates
similar to or above that projected for Chile, because of strong convergence effects. In terms
of the fundamental factors that determine growth, Chile, as previous sections have shown,
ranks at the top of its region. But the East Asian countries are expected to do even better.
According to De Gregorio and Lee (2004), a sample of nine East Asian countries can grow
at 3.8 percent a year in per capita terms from 2000 to 2010; one of the main differences
explaining this gap is that East Asia is much more open and integrated to the world. An
interesting alternative case is the projections of Consensus Forecast, which simply combine
projections using any methodology done by professional forecasters. Their forecast for
Chile is also about 5 percent. This is not generally the case, since, for example, cross-
country regressions usually predict higher growth for the East Asian countries than does
Consensus Forecast. Indeed, according to Consensus Forecast, Chile is projected to grow
faster than many East Asian countries, including South Korea, and indeed Chile’s projected
growth for the next ten years places it in the top decile of countries.
Growing at an average rate of 5 percent is quite important, since with the usual business
cycle ﬂuctuations it would not be unlikely for Chile to have periods of growth close to 7 to
8 percent, and slowdowns at 2 to 3 percent. However, given Chile’s current macroeconomic
policy framework, it is likely that these ﬂuctuations will moderate. Of course, there are also
areas that can be improved and where improvement would pay off in terms of growth and
welfare. As already discussed, increasing R&D expenditure would increase innovation and
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the lack of R&D expenditure is more evident. Improving the quality of education and
ensuring more social integration, as a way of compensating for inequality, would also spur
growth. There are also some institutional areas, such as closing of businesses and creation
of collateral, where substantial progress is possible. Finally, a good and active social policy
that decreases the risk to reduce inequality through policies that undermine growth, is very
important. The key is to combat inequality without harming growth and employment.
6 Concluding Remarks
6.1 On Growth Fundamentals
I have listed several policy areas where improvement is possible and would foster growth
in Chile. It is tempting to keep adding to what is already a detailed list, but ultimately the
question one would like to have answered is, What are the main foundations that support
the accumulation of human and physical capital and improvements in productivity-in short,
that determine economic growth?
In a recent book, William Easterly (2001) provides a simple yet profound answer to this
question: “To ﬁnd their way from poverty to riches, we need reminding that people do what
they get paid to do. We now have statistical evidence to back up theories of how panaceas
failed and how incentive-based policies can work” (p. xii). And he concludes, “We have
learned once and for all that there are no magical elixirs to bring a happy ending to our
quest for growth. Prosperity happens when all players in the development game have the
right incentives” (p. 289).
However, I would like to go one step further. I want to ask, What are the fundamental
factors that encourage economic growth? What are the incentives that lead people to devote
their efforts to productive activity? Given the experience of the Chilean economy, and given
the notion that one has to get the incentives right, I think that two basic principles underlie
growth:
² Secure property rights. When people invest in their own human capital, or when
entrepreneurs invest in plant and equipment or in new techniques to increase their
productivity, they must be certain that the beneﬁts of these investments will not be
taken from them. For this to happen, property rights need to be clearly deﬁned and
respected.
² An adequate structure of rewards. Investment and effort must be adequately re-
warded. This is essential to encouraging creativity, entrepreneurship, and a growth-
promoting allocation of talent.
In terms of policy, securing property rights implies setting clear rules of the game.
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Changes in tax policies, for example, change the proﬁtability of investment in physical
and human capital, in effect reducing or increasing the value of that capital. Improving
regulation, too, often changes proﬁtability. A ﬁrm that has become a monopoly may be
obliged to take steps to reduce its monopoly power, which reduces its proﬁts. In short,
redistribution happens. The important thing is to be clear on the limitsof property rightd.
To achieve this, nations must have strong institutions and clear rules to deﬁne and delimit
property rights, as well as mechanisms for fair compensation when changes in policy have
redistributive effects.
In a democracy, taxes are generally decided by the legislature, and no one should be
surprised, although some may not like it, when changes in taxes occur. Of course, a sound
constitution and good laws will prevent arbitrary enforcement of the tax laws and outright
expropriation. The lesson here is again on the need to have strong institutions, and these
institutions must have a clear orientation toward protecting property rights.
As this paper has discussed, Chile already had strong institutions well before the growth
take-off of the mid-1980s. But even when a country’s institutions are oriented to protecting
property rights and generating incentives for investment and productivity growth, that is
not enough. A stable macroeconomic environment is also an important part of securing
property rights. High and unstable inﬂation also redistributes income, usually from savers
to borrowers, and this discourages saving. By, in effect, liquidating nominal public debt,
inﬂation also redistributes wealth from bondholders to governments. The same can be said
of sharp changes in interest rates, of freezes on deposits in the event of a banking crisis,
and so on. Macroeconomic stability thus promotes growth by providing a safe environment
in which to invest, allowing entrepreneurs to focus on the usual and unavoidable risks of
business.
But the second principle-an adequate reward structure-is also important. One can imag-
ine a country in which property rights are secure and immutable but the business sector
consists of a group of monopolists enjoying signiﬁcant barriers to entry. No one will then
have any incentive to invest or to compete: the established monopolists have no need to
do so, and any potential new entrant will ﬁnd itself at a clear disadvantage. Therefore
the means to establish this second principle in the economic arena is competition, full and
strong competition, that allows markets to operate efﬁciently.39 Openness and free trade,
in turn, are essential to ensure and increase competition, especially in a small economy.
In order to compete and succeed, ﬁrms will need to be efﬁcient and creative. Absent any
competitive threat to established business, there will be no incentive for these businesses to
be efﬁcient.
Of course, there will be externalities that require public intervention; for example, and
recalling the earlier discussion, the inability of innovators to appropriate the full rewards of
their innovation means that R&D will tend to be underprovided. Encouraging R&D through
39Parente and Prescott (2000) have formally shown the importance of competition and well-
functioning markets for encouraging growth.
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mind. If support for R&D generates rent seeking and allows dubious projects to proﬁt
from government support, a good policy in principle could have bad results in practice.
Policies must be designed in a way that is mindful of the incentives they create. Similar
considerations apply to public investment.
Thesecondprinciplealsohasimplicationsforsocialpolicy. Itisimportantthatworkers,
as well as businesses, receive rewards appropriate to their effort. A natural aspiration of
parents, especially among the poor, is that their children live more prosperous lives than
their own. For this they need opportunities. A person’s income from labor will depend on
the productivity of that labor, and so the goal of educational policy must be to transfer useful
knowledge and so transform people into more productive workers. Stated more generally,
this second principle translates into social mobility, or equal opportunity, on the social front.
We can better understand Chile’s strengths and challenges in the light of these two
principles. Chile’s institutions are strong, its macroeconomic environment is stable, and
therefore property rights are well protected. In addition, the Chilean economy is very open,
competition is robust, social policies are well designed, and the ﬁnancial sector efﬁciently
allocates funds to good projects and to investors with good ideas. Hence there are good
incentives in place for investment, which can expect an adequate reward. The quality of
education must be improved, and efforts to reduce inequality, through social policies to im-
prove the living conditions of the poor and to create conditions for greater social mobility,
must be reinforced. Increased incentives for innovation and for the adaptation of techno-
logical progress will also increase the chances of achieving sustained rapid growth. From
the point of view of government activities, it is important to focus on how to foster growth
and help the poor and the disadvantaged, while minimizing policy distortions. This is not
a trivial challenge, but as long as growth can be sustained, the job is made easier, because
populist temptations are then reduced, although never eliminated.
Finally, although public policy can do a lot to create a pro-growth environment, even
that is not enough. Some good luck also helps. Luck can take the form of an abundant en-
dowment of resources, a favorable climate, prosperous and cooperative neighbors, a strong
international environment, and so on. Unfortunately, a country can do little to improve its
luck, but it can prepare itself so as to exploit to the fullest any good luck that does come its
way.
6.2 On competition, privatization, regulation and innovation
I have argued that, in order to achieve productivity growth, spur innovation, and allocate
talent to productive activities, people’s effort and creativity must be rewarded. And in
this respect competition is essential. Opening up the economy brings competition. Those
who want to play in global markets, or to fend off foreign competition, must be efﬁcient
and productive. In the absence of competition, regulation must be designed to replicate
competition.
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its creation of an independent Competition Tribunal. Like an independent central bank,
an independent and specialized competition tribunal can minimize conﬂicts of interest and
guarantee competition. In a more narrow area but along the same lines, the disputes among
Chile’s electric companies will be resolved in the future by an independent panel, instead
of by the Minister of the Economy. Indeed, many regulatory reforms are usually necessary,
especially given the rapid technological advances in the utilities sector. But, in my view, the
most important institutional basis is to deﬁne how conﬂicts are resolved, who is responsible
for setting regulations, and who is charged with administering those regulations. Grant-
ing independence to and requiring accountability from regulators and deﬁning independent
panels to resolve problems sends a strong signal to investors about the stability of the rules
of the game.
Privatization has played an important role in deepening Chile’s markets. It has been
particularly important in the utilities sector. This is a typical case in which cross-country
evidence has not been able to estimate its growth effects, but certainly there must be some,
and at times signiﬁcant, gains. Privatization has fostered investment, and it has been impor-
tant vehicle for bringing foreign direct investment, which we know it has positive effects
on growth. Keeping the government out of productive activity but involved in regulation
fosters competition and spurs investment and productivity growth. An entity that is both
producer and regulator, the state in the case of public enterprises, faces enormous conﬂicts
of interest, an important case is the continuous struggle of ﬁnance ministers to avoid public
enterprisesbeingasourceofﬁscalimbalance, whilethoseﬁrmsendupsacriﬁcingproﬁtable
investment projects. In addition, incentives of its managers will not necessarily be aligned
with innovation and efﬁciency. Indeed, the corporate governance of Chile’s remaining pub-
lic enterprises, those for which speciﬁc reasons exist for not privatizing, must be close to
best practice among private ﬁrms. This will induce efﬁciency and reduce political interfer-
ence, which many times takes the guise of promoting social welfare or other “good” causes.
A lot of progress has been done, but there are still areas for improvement.
We do not have good estimates of the extent to which regulatory and other microeco-
nomic reforms may contribute to economic growth. But that should not prevent the pursuit
of further reforms, because although their measurement may be elusive, the beneﬁts are
certainly large. As I have discussed, institutions that improve the functioning of markets
are essential for growth. Even if some of them do not contribute directly through more rapid
growth, improving competition has clear welfare gains.
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